Civil Disobedience in Islam, written by Muhammad Haniff Hassan (2018) provides an analysis of opposing arguments that either support or condemn political dissent. Hassan defines civil disobedience as a pacifist movement against an authority that breaks the law and that is orchestrated for the purpose of producing a change within the governing institution that has been judged corrupt or unjust. The primary debates are centered around khurūj, maslahah-mafsadah, and claims of ijmā`. In this essay, we summarize Hassan’s findings and provide a brief comment about the scope and limits of his work.
Khurūj is the act of rejection or malalignment with an authority figure or ruler. Maslahah-mafsadah is the societal balance between benefits (maslahah) and harm (mafsadah). The claim of ijmā` is the concept that if an idea, law, or norm is agreed upon by everyone or reaches consensus, then it is considered of similar importance to scripture and tradition.
Arguments against civil disobedience have a significant amount of scriptural evidence drawn to support this perspective. However, many scholars have concluded that a large majority of scripture within the Qur’ān and Hadīths cannot be argued as definitive evidence and taken for what it says, rather most tend to be nondefinitive scripture and reliant on the interpretations of the words and context of the situation.
The issue of khurūj emphasizes this stance, as the act of khurūj, is completely reliant on the context and perspectives of the individual/society. Khurūj against a just and fair leader is never permissible, however khurūj against an unjust or corrupt ruler is argued both for and against. Verses within the Qur’ān command obedience to a just and righteous ruler, in this we find definitive scriptural evidence. However, khurūj remains associated with rebellion, and impending violence, which is discouraged.
Many nondefinitive and ambiguous traditions from Hadīth also encourage patience and effectively prohibit khurūj. Similarly, the claim of ijmā` has been made against rebellion and an act of khurūj. The claim of ijmā is considered a definitive ruling, and third ranked in importance following scriptural injunctions (following the Qur’ān and Hadīth), however there have been ongoing arguments which call into question the validity of this original claim of ijmā’ against civil disobedience. Although many Muslim scholars approach previous rulings of ijmā’ with skepticism, employing much scriptural and historical investigation before accepting a ruling, they remain aware that the ruling was made with certain intentions within the context of that time, and if they are fitting may also apply to the scholars’ present analysis.
Many scholars seek to understand the final ruling of civil disobedience and khurūj through the binary of maslahah-mafsadah, or the balance of benefits of good over the real of potential harm. Maslahah-mafsadah, while based on ideas within scripture, extends into other disciplines like political and social inquiries. Through this level of thought, the rulings for or against khurūj are highly context specific, and usually cannot be generalized to fit any future or historical situation. Many Muslim scholars believe that khurūj raises the risk of causing undue harm or bringing violence to a society–outweighing the benefits of change.
Arguments for civil disobedience also have a significant amount of scriptural evidence and face the same problem of nondefinitive scriptural evidence and emphasis on interpretation. Verses within the Qur’ān encourage Muslims to strive for justice and integrity, replacing evil with good deeds. Khurūj is often viewed as enacting change for the greater good of the people, making enacting khurūj a permissible act. Similarly, there is no prohibition against withdrawing allegiance from an unjust regime, protesting against it, weeding out injustice, or replacing a non-righteous leader with a just one.
The issue of khurūj, while still permissible, raises conflict due to its association with rebellion and violence, which are discouraged as it is seem as evil in nature. This played a part in the original claim of ijmā prohibiting khurūj, yet since this original claim was not based on definitive scriptural evidence and was made following a context which differs from present day Islam, its validity has remained in question. Typically, the claim of ijmā relies on the consensus agreement between Muslim scholars from any and all times and places following the first generation of Islam.
However, the issues of context and interpretations again face the claim of ijmā`, as centuries spanning across all Islamic settlements have called for the claim of ijmā`, leading many scholars to conclude that the ruling made following the claim of ijmā` might only have temporary validity and cannot be generalized to all temporal situations within Islamic tradition or conflict. Rather than rely on a claim of ijmā’, many scholars turn to the notion of maslahah-mafsadah, or the balance of good and harm.
In general, non-violent campaigns produced more successful and longer lasting social changes than violent campaigns. Similarity in order for khurūj to be accepted or permitted, it must abide by non-violent and pacific conditions, intending to cause social or political change which offer long-lasting benefits or remediate injustices.
This work is essentially a review of Sunni classic scholarship on dissent and rebellion. It did not address the origins and evolution of dissent and rebellion in the larger Muslim community, including among Shia and Ibadi Muslims. In Ibadi Islam, the ethics and laws of dissent, rebellion, and revolution are well articulated in Ibadism since they are the main cause of the schism that separated Ibadi Muslims from the community that remained under the governance of the caliphate systems in the Levant, Iraq, Turkey, or Egypt. In Shia Islam, especially in Zaydi Shia Islam, the ideas or rebellion and dissent are well enshrined in the religious and political discourses of communities since the 7th century.
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