Humanitarian Crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: What the Pause on U.S. Foreign Aid Could Mean for the DRC

by Molly Lihs

Abstract 

This paper examines the impact of the U.S. foreign aid freeze and cuts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the worsening humanitarian crisis amid ongoing conflict involving the Congolese government, the March 23 Movement (M23), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Rwanda, and other armed groups. As a major donor, the U.S. provides critical funding for food, shelter, medical supplies, hygiene, and sanitation, making Congolese communities heavily reliant on American aid. This paper analyzes the immediate and potential consequences of these aid cuts through emerging reports and historical cases where U.S. aid reductions during crises exacerbated suffering. It underscores the likelihood of escalating humanitarian distress and the compounded hardship faced by millions.

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Introduction

In 2024, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) received more humanitarian aid from the United States government than any other country in the world, at a staggering $920 million, which accounts for nearly 70 percent of all the humanitarian aid received by the DRC (Maclean & Jammeh, 2025). A large majority of this aid contributed to efforts to ensure access to food and nutrition support, water and sanitation services, medical supplies, and other essential resources and services. On January 20, 2025, the first day of his second term, President Donald Trump signed an executive order that called for a 90-day pause in new foreign assistance obligations and disbursements and required stop-work orders to be issued for all existing foreign assistance awards as the current foreign development assistance programs’ efficiency and consistency with the administration’s foreign policy position is assessed. On February 4, the Trump administration issued a directive that would essentially cease the operations of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the agency responsible for administering foreign aid and development assistance, and place thousands of its employees on leave (Walker & Lai, 2025). Reports from the United Nations and other sources have already emerged detailing the triage of services that is now required by humanitarian organizations, as the DRC is no longer receiving the same level of foreign aid, as well as the fears the Congolese people harbor as they face their uncertain future. As a result of the pause on foreign aid from the United States, the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, and other crises like it that rely on American aid, could become even more catastrophic.  

Background on the DRC and Ongoing Conflict

The DRC has witnessed decades of violence within its borders. Following the Rwandan Civil War and Rwandan Genocide, millions of Hutu refugees crossed the border in the DRC, largely settling in camps in the eastern regions of North and South Kivu. Some of these refugees were Hutu extremists who began forming militias in the DRC. As a result, the Rwandan government turned to the DRC (then Zaire) to root out the Hutu rebel groups that had sought refuge there and depose then-dictator of Zaire, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (also known as Mobutu Sese Seko), who posed a threat to regional security. Uganda, Burundi, Angola, and Eritrea joined the invasion, along with an anti-Mobutu coalition, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), which was led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. When Mobutu fled Zaire and the anti-Mobutu coalition emerged victorious, Kabila assumed the mantle of leadership in the newly named Democratic Republic of Congo. 

The Second Congo War, known as the Great African War or Africa’s World War, brought about destruction at a level unseen since the Second World War. Despite the alliance between Kabila and the neighboring Rwandan and Ugandan governments during the First Congo War, friendly ties dissolved when Kabila implemented an authoritarian regime and alienated his former supporters, demanding that all Rwandan and Ugandan forces present in the DRC return to their countries and removing ethnic Tutsis from his government. Kabila also allowed armed Hutu groups to mass at the eastern border, stoking ethnic tensions from the previous conflicts (Center for Preventive Action, 2025a).

In August 1998, rebels supported by Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi launched a rebellion against Kabila’s regime, leading to a complex internationalized civil war, a staggering death toll of 3 to 5 million, and unimaginable violence and instability across the region. The conflict was characterized as one of the darkest acts perpetrated by humans against one another, such as systemic rape and sexual violence, ethnic cleansing, and cannibalism, reflecting its inconceivable brutality. Furthermore, the conflict brought about a widespread humanitarian crisis in the DRC. Disease and malnutrition caused more deaths throughout the war and its aftermath than armed violence. The conflict also displaced nearly 2 million Congolese civilians, forcing them to leave their homes and seek asylum elsewhere in the DRC or neighboring countries. The conflict came to an official end following the signing of a series of peace agreements between the Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments and the warring rebel parties, which laid the foundation for a transitional government under Joseph Kabila upon the official end of the conflict. However, instability resulting from violence fueled by armed rebel groups continued to plague the country and its citizens, especially those in the regions of Katanga, Ituri, and North and South Kivu, and continues to this day. 

Despite the attempt to transition the government and bring stability to the region, ethnic rivalries, a power vacuum following the withdrawal of foreign troops from the eastern DRC, and disputes over land and mineral wealth stoked the conflict between existing rebel groups for years after. During this time, densely populated cities became battlegrounds, civilians were targeted and beaten, raped, abducted and killed, and tens of thousands fled to neighboring countries (Sriram et al., 2014).

Following the end of the Second Congo War, some groups were disarmed or merged with other militant groups, but the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a major Rwandan Hutu rebel group, and some Mai-Mai militia groups remained operational in the DRC. Additionally, following an agreement between the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a Congolese Rwanda-backed rebel group, and the Congolese government, the CNDP merged with the Congolese military. With renewed violence in North and South Kivu, where the CNDP had been operating, a new rebel faction known as M23 emerged to fill the void that the CNDP left behind. 

The March 23 Movement (M23), also known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army, is a Tutsi-led rebel paramilitary group that was formed in 2012 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025b). It currently operates in the eastern regions of the DRC under the guise of protecting Congolese Tutsis in the region who have historically been discriminated against and rooting out Hutu extremists, with its major rebel opponent being the Hutu-majority FDLR. M23 is widely understood to be supported by Rwanda, reflecting the perpetuation of regional conflict, though the Rwandan government denies this. However, this support is clear for the international community’s eyes to see. Beyond the other proclaimed causes for M23’s presence in the DRC, M23 and the Rwandan government have a deep interest in the eastern region of the DRC because of the vast wealth present, largely in the form of minerals. Rwanda has been accused of looting minerals from the DRC, and since M23 seized Congolese mineral mines at the start of its renewed offensive, Rwanda has seen a growth in mineral exports, including an increase from earnings near $772 million to $1.1 billion from 2022 to 2023, which supports claims that Rwanda is profiting from M23’s success (Rwanda Mines, Petroleum, and Gas Board, 2024).

In late 2012, shortly after its inception, M23 demonstrated its force by seizing territory and the major city of Goma, which is the capital city of North Kivu and home to approximately two million inhabitants. The group lost its momentum when Rwanda ceased its support after losing international funding due to its involvement with M23, and M23 was defeated by Congolese and UN troops in 2013. However, M23 continued its rebellion on a smaller scale in 2017 and regrouped to launch a larger offensive in 2022, during which the group battled Congolese forces in many border towns and forcibly displaced nearly 188,000 people by November 2022 (Al Jazeera, 2022). The DRC, U.S., United Nations (UN), and others accused Rwanda of sending its own troops to contribute to the fighting and commission of war crimes, with a UN report stating that there are approximately 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops deployed in the DRC (Lederer, 2024). 

As diplomatic efforts to establish sustainable peace between the Congolese and Rwandan governments and M23 have largely failed throughout the past three years, M23 has captured additional towns and cities and pushed into territories never before occupied by the group. Since the start of 2025, M23 has captured key towns and cities, including Masisi, Bukavu (the capital of South Kivu), and Goma.

In the last year alone, M23 has committed countless human rights violations. Thousands of Congolese women and children have been raped and assaulted. Médecins Sans Frontières (‘Doctors Without Borders’) treated 25,166 survivors of sexual violence in the DRC in 2023, and that figure was already surpassed by mid-2024. This number represents a small fraction of the incidents of sexual violence that have occurred in the DRC, as other aid organizations also provide healthcare treatments, and often survivors do not report their assaults. Men, women, and children have also been tortured and executed by M23 in unspeakable ways. Beyond witnessing the horrors of war, sexual violence, and starvation, civilians are forced to perform labor are constantly caught in the crossfire or directly targeted by artillery and rockets fired into displacement camps. M23 is not the only group responsible for the commission of these abhorrent human rights violations, as other groups, such as the Wazalendo fighters (DRC-allied rebels), FDLR, and the Congolese military have been accused of committing murder, torture, rape, and other inhumane acts, and contributing to the overall magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in the DRC (Laurence, 2025).

Humanitarian Crisis in the DRC

Today, the people of the DRC are forced to bear the burden of violent conflict on their already weary shoulders. A significant portion of the DRC’s inhabitants are deprived of adequate food, water, shelter, sanitation, and healthcare, as well as fundamental socio-economic and cultural liberties. Internal displacement has reached staggering proportions, with over 7 million people displaced within the country, and over 1 million seeking refuge beyond the country’s borders, with nearly 940,000 forced to flee their homes in 2024 as a result of the violence (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2025) and almost 80,000 displaced to nearby countries since the start of 2025 (UNHCR, 2025). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) residing in displacement camps are met with hunger, disease, inadequate sanitation, and dangerous living conditions, culminating in a high number of related deaths. The logistical challenges associated with the delivery of food, medicine, and other essential supplies are exacerbated by the disruption of transportation networks and targeted attacks on humanitarian non-governmental organizations and infrastructure. In a place where disease and sexual violence are especially pervasive*, fears concerning HIV/AIDS are substantiated, with a projected mortality rate of 8% in patients who are without access to antiretroviral treatments (Maclean & Jammeh, 2025). 

The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis is reflected in the fact that approximately 21.2 million people, which is just under 20% of the population, are in dire need of humanitarian assistance in the DRC (OCHA, 2025). Furthermore, the renewed ferocity of the conflict has resulted in groups on both sides interfering with aid delivery, thereby preventing lifesaving resources from reaching those in need. As Fred Baum, executive director of Ebuteli, a Congolese political research institute, says, “At the end of the day, it’s 30 years of suffering for millions of Congolese people who do not have anything to do with the interests of one [side] or another and who only want to live in a peaceful country” (Al Jazeera & Gathmann, 2025). This quote reflects how the ongoing conflict and accompanying crisis have stripped the Congolese people of the ability to lead normal lives. Additionally, the DRC-based humanitarian organizations’ inability to provide even the most basic resources effectively denies IDPs and other vulnerable populations other fundamental human rights, such as education.

* Note on sexual violence in the DRC: 1 in 10 women in displacement camps have been raped, and sexual violence has become systematic outside of these camps as well. Additionally, a significant portion of victims of sexual violence are children. In the week of January 27 to February 2, 30% of rape survivors treated at 42 UNICEF-affiliated healthcare facilities were reported to be children, and the real figure is likely higher (Al Jazeera, 2025).

U.S. Foreign Aid to the DRC, 2003-2025

Amid this overwhelming need for assistance, American foreign aid has played a vital role in providing essential support. According to the Financial Tracking Service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the U.S. government has provided nearly $5.3 billion in aid to the DRC since the Second Congo War ended in 2003. In 2023, the United States government provided an unprecedented level of support, providing over 50% of the coordinated plan funding for humanitarian aid to the DRC. In 2024, that number jumped to nearly 70%, with the U.S. providing $920 million in humanitarian aid (Maclean & Jammeh, 2025). According to OCHA, roughly 60% of humanitarian aid to the DRC went to food security, 5% went to health, 6% went to water, sanitation, and hygiene, and 4% went to protection that year. Since the start of 2025, the U.S. has provided 17% of the total humanitarian aid funding disbursed for the DRC, at roughly $37 million. However, because of the foreign aid freeze and additional cuts to foreign aid programs, this total may not see a significant increase in the months to come.

Trump Administration 2025 Foreign Aid Halt

On January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump ordered a 90-day pause on foreign development assistance with the stated intent of reviewing the U.S. assistance programs’ efficiency and consistency with his administration’s foreign policy. On January 27, the U.S. State Department issued an order pausing all existing and future aid with exceptions for military funding to Israel and Egypt, emergency food assistance, and certain life-saving aid programs and placing dozens of USAID officials on leave. The next day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a waiver allowing some lifesaving aid to continue. On February 4, the Trump administration issued a directive that would essentially cease all operations of USAID, placing thousands of USAID personnel on leave and recalling nearly all of those working overseas. By February 6, USAID officials were notified that the agency’s global workforce would be reduced to just a few hundred workers. 

On February 8, Judge Carl Nichols blocked the order to place thousands of USAID personnel on leave and recall overseas workers. Days later, multiple nonprofits filed two lawsuits challenging the aid freeze. On February 13, Judge Amir H. Ali issued a court order to temporarily continue funding, but by February 19, aid groups reported that the administration was not abiding by the order and filed an emergency motion to enforce it. On February 23, following Judge Nichols’ decision to allow the administration to carry out their plans to place thousands of USAID workers on leave, thousands were placed on leave and two thousand agency employees were fired. In late February, the administration announced that they terminated 90% of USAID’s foreign aid contracts. Weeks later, however, Secretary Rubio announced that 83% of USAID’s programs were cut, which totals about $54 billion. The aid cuts caused Judge Ali to issue an order directing the USAID and State Department to pay nearly $2 billion in already completed work. The U.S. Supreme Court initially blocked the order, but on March 5 the block on the order was lifted, and the administration was ordered to release the aid (Walker & Lai, 2025). Additionally, the Supreme Court asked Judge Ali to provide clarifications about the obligations of the government, as the deadline Ali proposed had passed. As of March 15, no further updates have been provided regarding further aid cuts or any of the ongoing lawsuits. 

Throughout the brief course of these deeply impactful events a USAID administrator, Nicholas Enrich, released a memo outlining the potential costs of the Trump administration’s decision to cut foreign aid and dismantle USAID. Enrich and his coauthors estimate the risks of cutting billions of dollars of lifesaving humanitarian assistance around the world include: 

1. One million children deprived of treatment for severe acute malnutrition;
2. 11 million newborns deprived of critical postnatal care;
3. 12 to 18 million additional cases of malaria;
4. A 28-32% increase in tuberculosis; and
5. 28,000 additional cases of emerging infectious diseases, such as Ebola.

Similarly, early memos from experts and officials in the DRC in the weeks following the foreign aid cuts and dismantling of USAID have reflected similar estimates as those outlined in Enrich’s USAID memo. 

Incoming Reports about Aid Cuts from the DRC

In the weeks following President Trump’s executive order and the dismantling of USAID, humanitarian organizations, crucial providers of support within the DRC, have encountered significant challenges in providing essential resources and services. Some organizations have been forced to periodically suspend and resume their operations, leaving many desperate Congolese without food, water, adequate shelte, and sanitation, and enduring a state of constant fear regarding their uncertain future (ACAPS, 2025). 

Despite the claim by Secretary Marco Rubio about the issuance of temporary waivers for lifesaving aid, there has been little clarity as to whether a waiver could be granted to humanitarian programs in the DRC. This ambiguity has left many aid organizations without the necessary funding or direction following the elimination of nearly all of USAID’s foreign aid contracts. Furthermore, lingering fears about the long-term impact of the freeze and cuts to U.S. foreign aid on addressing the humanitarian crises in the DRC have prompted a state of higher alert.

With 17.6 million people experiencing food insecurity in the DRC, including millions of children facing severe acute malnutrition, and the food security sector representing the largest recipient of funding from all donors, particularly the U.S. at $570 million, the aid cuts directly impact some of the most vulnerable people on Earth. To further amplify this crisis, since M23 took control of Goma, where many IDPs reside, markets and supply chain routes have been disrupted, causing food shortages and a steep increase in food prices, ranging from 18-160%. In a time when foreign humanitarian assistance is paramount, the DRC is confronting a compounding crisis as conflict, displacement, and dwindling resources converge. 

In an article by the Associated Press, the director-general of the African Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Jean Kaseya, reported that the DRC has felt the immediate effects of the aid cuts, as the DRC is the epicenter for Mpox outbreaks in Africa and now faces additional challenges in testing for and treating many infectious diseases, as well as transporting samples, vaccines, and other necessary resources (Muhumuza, 2025).  

The Physicians for Human Rights report that healthcare workers are risking their lives to address the rising rate of violence, injuries, and other effects of the conflict and crisis, all while medical facilities are overburdened by mass displacements and the outbreak of infectious disease. Additionally, survivors of sexual violence, of which there are many, have not been able to receive the care they desperately need. Resources like blood bank reserves and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits for HIV are now even more difficult to obtain, with some facilities set to run out in the coming days. Not only do these kits provide medical equipment, but they also provide forms needed to collect evidence and give survivors of sexual violence a chance to seek justice (PHR, 2025). 

These reports reflect the immediate and consequential impact of the cut to humanitarian aid on the DRC and those already vulnerable as a result of the ongoing conflict. They also set the stage for concerns about the long-term implications of reduced humanitarian assistance, with additional incoming reports estimating that the short-term impacts already witnessed will have a much larger effect on the DRC in the future.

U.S. Aid to the DRC & Colonial Legacies: Aid as Leverage?

As in many other previously colonized nations, especially those in Africa, the DRC has struggled to grapple with the lasting effects of colonialism and its complex legacy. The DRC experienced severe brutality under its Belgian colonizers beginning with the rule of King Leopold II, under whom the Congo Free State was created in 1885. The Congo Free State, like colonies around the world, was created with borders that disregarded historical borders or territories held by different communities, planting the seeds for conflict and instability early on. Initially, after dispossessing local communities of their lands, Leopold II owned the Congo as his personal property through which he could trade, but near the time of his passing in the early 20th century, the Congo became property of the state. The Congo Free State was drained of its natural resources by Leopold II and other European colonizing powers, with the Congolese people terrorized and forced into submission and harsh labor. After the annexation of the Belgian Congo, forced labor, miseducation, and oppressive practices continued as the norm, leaving the Congolese people economically and politically destitute. In 1960, the Congo was granted independence. The post-colonial government was weak and unstable following decades of subjugation, leading to the Congo Crisis, which ended when Joseph-Désiré Mobutu seized power (Tunamsifu, 2022). 

During the Congo Crisis, the DRC was the site of a proxy war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as they sought to assert their influence over the Congo and its natural wealth. When the chaos erupted, with Congolese and Belgian soldiers clashing and thousands of Europeans driven out of the region, the UN stood with the Congolese government as they sought to remove Belgian troops from the newly independent nation. The U.S. supported the UN in this decision but feared that a Soviet intervention was possible. A CIA-supported operation to assassinate the first democratically-elected prime minister of the DRC, Patrice Lumumba, and the breakdown of the Congolese military led to Mobutu’s coup d’état and government takeover, which was welcomed by the U.S. government, as Mobutu supported a pro-Western government. Afterward, the U.S. became involved with the DRC in a multitude of ways. From military support to diplomatic efforts on the DRC’s behalf to a joint mission to rescue hostages from cities under rebel control, the U.S. tucked the DRC deep under its wing, and the DRC provided a blockade against communism in Africa in return (Office of the Historian, n.d.).

While seemingly mutually beneficial, this partnership has brought a great deal of harm to the DRC. The exploitation of natural resources, especially tantalum, tin, tungsten, cobalt, coltan, and gold, while central to colonialism in the DRC, has also been central to modern diplomacy and trade, especially for the U.S. and other Western countries seeking to profit from the DRC’s instability. While the U.S. government has implemented a conflict minerals strategy aimed at enhancing regulations, promoting responsible trade, and protecting Congolese miners, challenges to implementing and enforcing different aspects of the strategy in the form of violence and corruption have stymied the abilities of the government and other organizations to address the connection between human rights abuses and the mining of conflict minerals. As previously mentioned, throughout the ongoing conflict, armed groups and some units of the Congolese military have sought to control mines and other mineral deposits in the eastern DRC. These groups have perpetrated various human rights abuses to this end. Additionally, in mines not controlled by armed rebel groups, there have been reports of human rights abuses such as forced evictions, sexual assault, child labor, arson, and physical abuse (Amnesty International, 2023). Some of these mines have been tied to U.S. interests. Furthermore, in recent years, major U.S. companies, including Apple, Dell, Microsoft, and Tesla, have been accused of “knowingly benefiting from and aiding and abetting the cruel and brutal use of young children in the Democratic Republic of Congo to mine cobalt” but have faced limited legal repercussions (Ogao, 2024). 

The dichotomy of providing aid for personal gain or out of altruistic responsibility to protect and sustain others is one that many scholars have explored, especially regarding U.S. aid, with mixed conclusions, indicating that both need and interest are important in aid decisions. By leveraging aid to the DRC with humanitarian aid, the U.S. achieves a few goals, including strengthening economic ties with the DRC, ensuring investment opportunities, and countering Chinese and Russian influence, as both have been involved in the region either politically or economically, and promoting democracy and a stable region, as conflict and crime can impact American interests. 

In a similar vein, by providing aid, the U.S. has perpetuated a cycle of instability and reliance on the Western world. Constant aid reduces the urgency for institutional and structural development, leaving the DRC with a weak government and limited infrastructure and economic opportunities. Additionally, corruption, either by the U.S. seeking economic gain or groups in the DRC, has led to the misdirection of aid. Lastly, as mentioned, the U.S. has been involved in political affairs in the DRC, influencing the political landscape through assassinations (i.e., the assassination of Lumumba), endorsing political candidates despite allegations of election fraud, most notably current President Félix Tshisekedi, and providing resources to counter non-western influence (Gramer & O’Donnell, 2019).

In March 2025, it was reported that Congolese and American government officials had begun discussing potential deals regarding Congolese minerals, including talks of a minerals-for-security deal proposed by a Congolese senator. The State Department spokesperson has stated that the Trump administration is open to discussing a partnership, given that many minerals found in the DRC are essential for producing advanced technologies. Furthermore, as the Congolese government looks to diversify its partners, the U.S. has the opportunity to compete against China, whose state-owned mining companies currently dominate the DRC (Rolley & Crowe, 2025). The interest in economic gain reflects a consistent pattern of motivation for U.S. involvement in the DRC, including its decision to provide an enormous amount of aid to the DRC throughout the last few decades. 

The historical context of U.S. involvement in the DRC, deeply rooted in colonial legacies and shaped by ongoing economic and political interests, has played a significant role in the DRC’s current struggles. As the Trump administration’s foreign aid cuts unfold, concerns regarding the immediate and long-term consequences for the Congolese people have arisen amidst the devastating humanitarian crisis, reflecting a continuation of economic exploitation and instability, rather than genuine efforts to foster peace, stability, and independence.  

Future Fears Regarding Humanitarian Aid Cuts

In the March 13 report published by ACAPS (‘Assessment Capabilities Project’), it was stated that the funding cut will have an adverse effect on the implementation of the 2025 Humanitarian Needs Response Plan (HNRP) for the DRC. The HNRP is a funding and response plan that aims to provide lifesaving aid and assistance to and improve the protection of the Congolese people. The HNRP requires $2.5 billion in assistance to meet its goal of delivering basic, life-saving necessities to 11 million people. For example, $1.1 billion of the total requested amount is allocated to food assistance. However, as of March 4, only 11% of that funding had been disbursed, leaving an enormous gap in resources to address the growing crisis (OCHA, 2025). 

ACAPS also reported that, as of March 11, the USAID website had been restricted, with information about humanitarian presence and activities no longer accessible. While data collection already faced extreme restraints, reduced funding to humanitarian organizations and restricted access to communities in need by the warring parties as the conflict continues to worsen will further hinder our ability to conceptualize the situation in the eastern DRC and what steps must be taken to protect and alleviate the suffering of those affected by the conflict and humanitarian crisis (ACAPS, 2025). 

Given these two factors, it can be predicted that as the pause on foreign aid continues, humanitarian goals will not be met, services will not be rendered, millions will suffer beyond their already unimaginable circumstances, and the outside world will struggle to understand that suffering because of the lack of information and data coming out of the DRC. To widen our understanding of the consequences of cutting foreign aid to a country experiencing a humanitarian crisis, we can look to the past at the following events:

• Cuts to U.S. aid to Yemen, 2019-2020
• Cuts to U.S. aid to Sudan, 2005-2007

US History of Foreign Aid Cuts

Yemen, 2019-2020

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is one of the world’s most severe, driven by years of conflict between the Houthis, Yemeni government, and other groups beginning in 2014, following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The ongoing conflict has led to the displacement of millions and disruption to essential services. Millions live in poverty and are in need of food, water, shelter, and healthcare. Malnutrition, starvation, and disease are a trademark of the crisis, and destroyed infrastructure and dangerous armed fighting has created a logistical nightmare for those seeking to provide aid. 

In March 2020, the Trump administration’s decision to drastically cut essential humanitarian aid to Yemen and pressure other governments and organizations to reduce their aid exacerbated an already precarious situation. The stated goal of the aid reduction was to disrupt the Houthi insurgents’ control and obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid from the UN and World Food Programme in Houthi-controlled areas of the country. However, the consequences far outweighed the strategic gains, plunging millions of Yemenis deeper into desperation. Coupled with restrictions by the Houthi forces, the U.S. cuts to humanitarian aid dramatically worsened the crisis and created a funding vacuum at the most devastating time (Simpson, 2020). 

Yemen, like the DRC, was already severely underfunded, receiving only a fraction of the aid requested by humanitarian organizations for the year, so the impact of U.S. aid reduction was immediate and profound. In 2019, Yemen received nearly $915 million in crucial U.S. funding, making up a little more than 23% of all humanitarian aid to the country. In 2020, the U.S. cut nearly $225 million in humanitarian aid, but became the largest donor at $690 million, providing nearly 31% of humanitarian aid. This shift indicates a widespread downward trend in support of Yemen, given that many countries, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, reduced their aid to Yemen at the behest of the American government, amongst other reasons such as donor fatigue, which refers to the diminished willingness of donor countries or organizations to continue providing aid, often due a long crisis, a lack of progress, or domestic restraints (Financial Tracking Service, 2024, 2025). 

This trend deeply impacted the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide essential services, especially food assistance and clean water. As a result of cut funding, millions of Yemeni civilians in dire need of food assistance were unable to access it, leading to increased rates of starvation. Furthermore, cuts to aid further strained the already fragile Yemeni healthcare system. With the deadly COVID-19 pandemic rapidly spreading, as well as outbreaks of other diseases, the healthcare system in Yemen endured an unbearable hardship. Years of conflict left only half of the country’s healthcare facilities operational, and those remaining were critically understaffed and under-resourced (Simpson, 2020). In summary, U.S. aid cuts to Yemen at a time when humanitarian assistance was most needed severely hindered efforts to provide necessary resources and services to those affected by the humanitarian crisis. 

Sudan, 2005-2007

The humanitarian crisis in Sudan in the early 2000s was fueled by the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) and the Darfur Conflict (2003-?), which were characterized by ethnic/religious conflict, sexual violence, genocide, and other crimes against humanity (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025a). Throughout the course of the conflicts, food insecurity was widespread, access to healthcare was extremely limited, and aid organizations experienced difficulties reaching those in need. Additionally, millions of Sudanese civilians were displaced, either internally or to nearby countries, with many fleeing to neighboring Chad (UN News, 2023). 

In 2005, at the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the U.S. government provided the most amount of aid to Sudan at approximately $801.5 million, which was about 57% of all humanitarian aid to the country. In 2006, that number dropped drastically to $685.5 million, which was approximately 50% of all aid. In 2007, that number dropped yet again to $535 million and 39%, with a loss of roughly $266.5 million from 2005 to 2007 (Financial Tracking Service, 2017, 2019). Furthermore, in 2006, additional sanctions beyond those in place since the 1990s were placed on some in Sudan targeting those responsible for the atrocities in Darfur. These sanctions limited U.S. assistance to Sudan and introduced additional challenges for aid organizations attempting to navigate complex financial restrictions and continue to provide aid to Sudan.

Between 2005 and 2007, the humanitarian crisis took a downward turn, with funding shortages forcing the World Food Programme, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to cut lifesaving programs, including food services, for millions of Sudanese civilians. All of these organizations received fractions of the requested aid needed to serve the millions in need, reflecting the desperate need for the funding cut by the U.S. However, the exacerbation of the crisis cannot be placed entirely on the lack of aid, as some other factors that worsened the crisis include severe floods in 2007 and continued violence in Darfur and other regions after the failures of multiple peace agreements (HRW, 2006). 

The experiences of Yemen and Sudan provide a potential preview of what could unfold in the DRC following the cancellation of the majority of American foreign aid contracts and programs. All three countries experienced a complex, long-term conflict with millions displaced or otherwise directly impacted by the conflict. Starvation, sexual violence, and various human rights abuses were prevalent throughout all three situations, with basic necessities such as food, water, shelter, healthcare, and other resources to address the effects of the violence in urgent demand. After losing vital aid, Yemen and Sudan witnessed the worsening of already devastating humanitarian crises. Now, with the DRC facing an even greater withdrawal of support and reports emerging that reflect a similar trajectory, fears about food insecurity, disrupted medical services, and escalating destruction and violence are likely to be justified. 

Conclusion

The abrupt cessation of U.S. foreign aid to the DRC and the dismantling of USAID has created a precarious and potentially catastrophic situation for the millions of Congolese in need of humanitarian assistance. As the DRC experiences an escalation in violence from M23 and even greater levels of displacement, vital funding from the U.S. could not be more important. The sudden withdrawal has already led to the disruption of services and the exposure of additional millions of Congolese civilians to the devastating consequences of reduced services, such as disease, malnutrition, and death, which have been reflected in grim reports from the DRC. Additionally, information estimates made by aid organizations and human rights experts about the future of the humanitarian crisis in the DRC have highlighted the looming devastation. Historical precedents, such as U.S. aid cuts to Yemen and Sudan corroborate these predictions, as they demonstrate the consequences of slashing support during a time of crisis and highlight the effects felt in similar situations when the U.S. has changed its foreign aid objectives to the detriment of those in desperate need. 

Overall, this abrupt shift jeopardizes the immediate survival of millions, and the creation of a funding gap raises concerns about further destabilization, potentially hindering efforts to promote peace and stability in a region plagued by decades of conflict. Ultimately, the decision to freeze U.S. aid to the DRC without any exception or clear alternatives in place represents a failure to protect and defend humanity’s most vulnerable in their darkest hour. Given the well-documented consequences of similar actions in the past, this move signals a shift in foreign policy priorities that will have significant implications for the DRC, others facing humanitarian crises, and the international community as a whole.

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References

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