Human Rights Violations Within the US’ Treatment of Venezuelan Immigrants

Abstract

Current immigration situations within the US are fraught, and the case of Venezuelan immigrants is no exception.  Since 2021, they have been designated for Temporary Protected Status, which allows them to be safe from deportation and work legally in the United States .  However, recent changes under the Trump administration have jeopardized that status.  Beyond that, President Trump has used an 18th century law, the Alien Enemies Act, to quickly deport Venezuelans who are accused of being members of a transnational gang.  However, these actions have violated US domestic law, domestic court orders, and international human rights provisions.  This paper will examine the recent actions that have been taken surrounding Venezuelan immigrants and their human rights implications.

Background Information

The Origins of Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis

Since oil was first discovered in Venezuela in 1922, the country has centered its entire economy around oil production, at the expense of other sectors.  As the oil industry continued to grow, the Venezuelan government looked for ways to maximize its profits.  In 1976, the oil industry was nationalized after years of significant taxation on foreign oil companies operating in Venezuela.  While the oil industry sustained Venezuela and made it a prospering economy for many decades, that success would not last.  In 1998, Hugo Chavez was elected to the Venezuelan presidency on a socialist platform.  From then on, oil production began to decline, as did democratic processes.  As democracy eroded in the country, decreased oil production led to significant economic strife as well.  Throughout Chavez’s rule, he ended term limits for the presidency, took control of the previously independent Supreme Court, and closed independent press sources.  While Venezuela was not yet completely autocratic, democracy was certainly weakening (Roy & Cheatham, 2024).

The declining oil production under Chavez became an even more significant issue in 2014 when oil prices dropped significantly worldwide (Roy & Cheatham, 2024).  This price drop launched Venezuela into crisis and “exposed the damage to Venezuela’s economy from years of economic mismanagement” (Brown et al., 2022).  Between 2014 and 2021, the Venezuelan GDP shrunk by nearly 75%.  Additionally, because the government relied on oil money for 58-66% of its operating expenses, the country essentially ground to a halt due a lack of government funding (Roy & Cheatham, 2024).  

As the oil industry sputtered, the political situation in Venezuela also deteriorated.  After Chavez’s death in 2013, Nicolás Maduro, a known Chavez ally, won the presidency in a tightly contested election (Roy & Cheatham, 2024).  From there, the country quickly descended into autocracy.  Maduro “cracked down on the opposition, media, and civil society; engaged in drug trafficking and corruption; convened fraudulent elections; and impeded humanitarian aid distribution” (Brown et al., 2022).  These autocratic behaviors allowed Maduro to win re-election in 2018 in a sham election.  To rig the election, opposition candidates were forbidden from running and government workers were threatened with withholding of benefits and food if they did not vote for Maduro (Brown et al., 2022).  So, while Maduro allegedly received nearly 70% of the votes, the election results are unreliable and do not represent the true will of the Venezuelan people.  As time has passed, Maduro has further expanded his power and eliminated the traditional checks and balances of a democratic government.  While the judiciary was already under government control, Maduro took over the legislative branch in 2021, which had previously been the last independent part of the Venezuelan government (Brown et al., 2022).

As Maduro evolved into a dictator, other countries have refused to recognize his government and applied sanctions against the country.  These sanctions are intended to pressure Maduro into changing his behavior, but they have “likely contributed to the steeper decline of the Venezuelan economy” (Brown et al., 2022).  Beyond that, the sanctions have also made it more challenging for humanitarian organizations in the country to provide assistance (Brown et al., 2022).

The economic and political crises in the country have contributed to an ongoing humanitarian crisis and countless human rights violations.  Government security forces violently suppress protestors and commit “extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and torture” (Brown et al., 2022).  Since 2014, all of these factors have contributed to a mass exodus of Venezuelans out of the country into South America, Latin America, and the US.  While many countries have supported Venezuelan migrants and adopted aid programs, recent treatment in the US has not been so favorable towards the migrants.  

History of TPS

The system of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) was first created in 1990 with the Immigration Act of 1990.  The law stipulated that TPS would be granted to countries that are experiencing “armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary temporary conditions” (Immigration Act, 1990). Per this law, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could designate a country for TPS, which can range from 6 to 18 months (National TPS Alliance, 2025).  Once a country was designated as a TPS recipient, eligible immigrants from that country would be protected from deportation and permitted to work in the US during the period of their TPS designation (Immigration Act, 1990).  To be eligible, individuals must be nationals of the country that has a TPS designation, apply during a registration period, and be already residing in the US.  Certain criminal activity makes people ineligible (Temporary Protected Status, 2025).  At least 60 days before TPS for a certain country is set to expire, the Secretary of DHS is expected to review the situation and ultimately determine if the nation still meets eligibility requirements.  If they determine not, TPS is not renewed and expires for that country (National TPS Alliance, 2025). Previous precedent suggests that TPS will only be terminated when conditions in the home country have improved enough for it to be considered safe for the immigrants to return (Paolini, 2025).  

TPS for Venezuela

Venezuela was first designated for TPS in 2021 under then-Secretary of DHS Alejandro Mayorkas (Amaya & Batalova, 2025).  Justifications for this designation included the country’s humanitarian emergency, including a prolonged “political and economic crisis” with rampant inflation, poverty, unemployment, and human rights abuses (Team WOLA, 2025).  The country was then redesignated for TPS in 2023 (Temporary Protected Status: Venezuela, 2025).  Furthermore, on January 17, 2025, Mayorkas extended Venezuela’s TPS through October 2, 2026 (National TPS Alliance, 2025).  On February 5, 2025, newly appointed Secretary of DHS Kristi Noem determined that Venezuela no longer met the conditions required for TPS.  Based on that, she chose to not renew the 2023 redesignation, which then expired on April 7, 2025.  Meanwhile, the 2021 designation was set to expire a few months later on September 10, 2025.  However, the decision not to renew TPS was met with rapid backlash and litigation.  The National TPS Alliance sued Secretary Noem over her decision to end Venezuela’s TPS (Temporary Protected Status: Venezuela, 2025).  As part of that court case, in March 2025, US District Court Judge Ed Chen ruled that the Venezuelan TPS designation that was scheduled to end on April 7, 2025 must continue until litigation was complete (Breaking: Federal Court Blocks Trump, n.d.).  On May 19, 2025, the Supreme Court overturned Chen’s decision, effectively terminating Venezuelan TPS under the 2023 designation (Temporary Protected Status: Venezuela, 2025).  However, on September 5, 2025, a panel of three district circuit judges upheld Chen’s decision (National TPS Alliance, 2025).  As of now, the 2023 designation for Venezuela TPS, which would have expired on February 5, 2025, is scheduled to run through October 2, 2026.  However, Noem plans to appeal the September 5 court ruling, which could jeopardize TPS in the future.  Separately, Noem has chosen to end the 2021 designation, which will conclude on November 7, 2025 (Temporary Protected Status: Venezuela, 2025).

Explanations for TPS termination

When Noem chose to terminate TPS for Venezuela, she made the vague argument that Venezuela no longer met the conditions for TPS (Team WOLA, 2025).  She has since expanded upon that statement, with claims that conditions have improved “in several areas such as the economy, public health, and crime,” allowing former TPS designees to be safely returned to Venezuela (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2025).  She also stated that TPS is “contrary to the ‘national interest’” of the United States (Orduz, 2025).  However, numerous sources and metrics contradict these claims and suggest that conditions have not improved as much as she argued.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains that conditions in Venezuela remain poor.  Furthermore, they emphasize that humanitarian access and assistance within the country is decreasing, despite an increasing need for aid (Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), n.d.).  Out of Venezuela’s 28.41 million person population, 13.5 million are facing “critical humanitarian needs”.  Additionally, 5.6 million Venezuelans face “severe humanitarian deprivations” (Team WOLA, 2025).

In economic terms, Venezuela’s situation has worsened.  Venezuela’s GDP had been experiencing consistent growth, with between 4-8% annual growth from 2022-2024.  However, in 2025, the GDP dropped by 4%.  Additionally, Venezuela’s GDP per capita is around $4,070, the lowest of any South American country.  The country is also plagued by extreme inflation, with inflation rising 180% between 2024 and 2025.  This inflation increase is the worst in the world, with increases between 0-3% considered the target (Real GDP Growth, 2025).  

Political and civil freedoms in Venezuela remain a severe problem.  Each year, Freedom House, a US-based non-profit, assigns a Freedom in the World Score to 208 countries and territories around the world.  This metric gives each territory a score out of 100 in areas of civil and political freedoms.  In 2024, Venezuela had a score of 15 out of 100, which dropped to 13 in 2025.  This places Venezuela amongst the lowest 30 ranked countries and territories in the world.  The two points that Venezuela lost were due to a worsening of minority representation in government and an increased use of social media to surveil citizens and political opposition.  Other concerns that Freedom House raised are a lack of free and fair elections, excessive arrest of political prisoners, state-sponsored violence against civilians (particularly protestors), and a media and judiciary that are primarily controlled by Maduro (Venezuela: Country Profile, 2025).  These metrics suggest that the economic and human rights situations in Venezuela are in fact continuing to worsen, despite Noem’s claims otherwise.  Even if certain conditions may have improved slightly, the poor conditions in the country are still more than enough to warrant an extension of TPS.  All in all, Noem’s justification for terminating TPS is faulty and not consistent with the current conditions in Venezuela. 

TPS As “Contrary to the National Interest”

In her justifications for terminating TPS for Venezuelans, Noem claimed that continuing the program is “contrary to the ‘national interest’” because it has allowed members of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua (TdA) into the country (Orduz, 2025). The gang will be discussed further later in this paper, but, broadly speaking, TdA is a transnational gang engaged in drug trade, kidnapping, and sex-trafficking.  Although the gang is relatively small compared with other Latin American groups, its levels of violence make it highly dangerous.  

While the gang certainly is dangerous, the threat TdA poses to the US is likely not as large as Noem claims.  It is estimated that there are 7,000 members of TdA around the world.  Many of them are not in the US; however, even if every single TdA member was in the US on TPS, that would still only constitute 2% of Venezuelan TPS recipients (Orduz, 2025).  In other words, Noem is claiming that the threat posed by less than 2% of Venezuelan TPS recipients is enough to cancel the entire program that benefits hundreds of thousands of other Venezuelans.

Beyond that, the TPS program does have significant benefits for the US economy.  If TPS protections were ended for Venezuelans, these people would lose their right to work in the United States.  It is estimated that the US economy would lose $3.5 billion annually if Venezuelan TPS were terminated.  Additionally, there would be a further annual loss of $434.8 million in Social Security taxes (Behind the headlines, 2023). 

Despite Noem’s claims that TdA makes Venezuelan TPS contrary to the national interest, the threat posed by this gang is likely not as significant as she claims.  Additionally, economic benefits from TPS actually make the program beneficial to the US in many ways.  Terminating TPS for Venezuela would likely have a net negative effect on the US, rather than producing the positive result that Noem suggests.

Ongoing Uncertainty

While Venezuelan TPS holders have been given some relief and protection through recent court cases, they are by no means in a secure situation.  Court cases are ongoing, and there is no guarantee that future cases will bring continued protection.  As of March 31, 2025, there were approximately 605,000 Venezuelan TPS holders residing in the US (Temporary Protected Status: Fact Sheet, 2025).  If TPS protections were ended, these Venezuelans would lose their right to work in the US along with their deportation protections.  They would risk deportation back to Venezuela, where conditions remain poor.  While some TPS holders may be able to remain in the US through other immigration statuses, “[…] many TPS holders lack any other form of immigration status” (National TPS Alliance, 2025).  This would cause significant family separations, with 2022 estimates suggesting that “54,000 US citizen children and 80,000 US citizen adults lived with a Venezuelan TPS holder” (National TPS Alliance, 2025).  

While all of the above risks are speculative and dependent on future court rulings, there have already been confirmed cases of Venezuelans experiencing human rights violations as part of this ongoing immigration struggle.

Use of Guantanamo Bay Detention Center

Between February 6 and 8 of 2025, 178 Venezuelan men were transported to Guantanamo Bay to be held for an indeterminate time (Kube & Ainsley, 2025).  Originally built in 2002, Guantanamo Bay is known for being a brutal prison with a history of human rights abuses, including torture (Towards the Closure of Guantanamo, n.d.).  The prison housed exclusively Muslim men and suspected terrorists for the first 20 years of its existence but began housing migrants under the current Trump administration (US transfers 11 Yemeni detainees, 2025).  Before the Venezuelan men were boarded onto the planes bound for Guantanamo, the men were falsely told that they would be deported to Venezuela.  Justifications for these deportations from the US government labeled these men as “criminals” who have committed “heinous acts of violence” (Kube & Ainsley, 2025).  More specifically, these men were accused of being members of the Tren de Aragua gang despite there being limited evidence of this and no judicial hearings against them.  In reality, over 30% of these men were deemed “low-threat illegal aliens” by the White House who had no criminal past.  On February 20, the men were deported back to Venezuela by way of Honduras (Kube & Ainsley, 2025).  Since being released, the men have spoken out about the poor treatment and human rights abuses they experienced, which will be further discussed in a later section.  In fact, the men deported to Guantanamo were not the only Venezuelan immigrants sent to foreign detainment sites.

Alien Enemies Act

While the litigation surrounding TPS has been ongoing, courts have been hearing other cases related to deportation measures aimed at Venezuelan immigrants.  On March 14, 2025, President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) of 1798 (Zhuang & Balk, 2025).  This law gives the President power to limit the behavior and movement of foreign nationals “during a declared war or in the event of an ‘invasion’ or ‘predatory incursion’ committed by a foreign government” (Elsea, 2025).  This law can also be used to authorize the deportation of any national from the invading foreign country, if the individual is deemed a threat to the United States.  The act has been invoked three previous times, all during times of war (during the War of 1812 and both World Wars) (Elsea, 2025).  During his March 14 invocation, Trump specifically targeted the Tren de Aragua gang, which had been declared a terrorist organization in February of 2025 (Zhuang & Balk, 2025).  TdA began in 2013 in Tocorón Prison in Northern Venezuela as a prison gang that eventually transformed into a wider, transnational organization.  The gang was originally involved in drug and gold trading but has since expanded its activity to include “sex-trafficking, contract killing and kidnapping” (Lambert, 2025).  Its membership is estimated around 7,000, making it smaller and poorer than many other Latin American gangs.  However, it is notorious for its highly violent style, making it one of Trump’s primary targets in his fight against drug trafficking and gangs (Lambert, 2025).

When Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act, he claimed that Tren de Aragua should be considered a “hybrid criminal state” because of its connection with the Maduro government and  the fact that it controlled some Venezuelan territory (Elsea, 2025).  From there, he argued that the TdA could be targeted under the AEA, because they were sufficiently similar to a foreign government.  The order authorized the deportation of TdA members, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) began to make arrests.  The men who were arrested were accused of gang membership because of their clothing and tattoos (Reichlin-Melnic, 2025).  While tattoos can sometimes be used to identify members of other Latin American gangs, the gangs found in Venezuela (including TdA) do not use tattoos or any other identifying markings.  The traits and characteristics that ICE agents are using to identify TdA members are faulty and are resulting in the arrest of non-TdA members (Acevedo et al., 2025).  The AEA does not allow for the deportation of suspected TdA members, only those who are confirmed to be members (Donald J. Trump, 2025).  However, there is little proof that many of the arrested men were members of the gang or even violent criminals (Martinez-Beltran & Rueda, 2025).  Consequently, ICE is making arrests and deportations based on speculation alone, thus violating the requirements of the Alien Enemies Act.

On March 15, one day following the invocation of the AEA, the ACLU filed a federal lawsuit seeking to block the law’s use.  That same day, federal judge James Boasberg ordered that the law could not be used as justification for deportations.  Furthermore, he ordered that any deportation flights that had already left the US must return. However, on March 16, three deportation flights arrived in El Salvador containing 238 Venezuelan men who were being deported under the AEA as alleged members of TdA (Reichlin-Melnic, 2025). These men were accused of being violent, dangerous members of the TdA, when, in reality, less than 10% of them had criminal records (Martinez-Beltran & Rueda, 2025).  Two of the March 16 deportation flights were already en route to El Salvador when Boasberg issued his order, while another one took off after the order was released.  El Salvador’s president Nayib Bukele flaunted the violation of the order by posting “oopsie … too late” on social media in direct response to Boasberg’s mandate (Zhuang & Balk, 2025).  

The men who arrived in El Salvador were then held in El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT) (Reichlin-Melnick, 2025).  This facility has been the recipient of numerous human rights complaints, with documented violations of torture, sleep deprivation, and lack of medical care (Ingber & Roehm, 2025).  While the men were incarcerated, there was public debate over who had jurisdiction of the men.  The Trump administration continuously denied that the men were under US control, while Bukele simultaneously stated that the US was paying the country to hold the men (Reichlin-Melnick, 2025).  Furthermore, both President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio utilized social media to thank the El Salvadoran president for allowing the use of CECOT to house the men (Ingber & Roehm, 2025).  The men were finally released to Venezuela on July 18 as part of a prisoner swap between the US and Venezuela, further suggesting that the men were actually under US jurisdiction the entire time (Reichlin-Melnick, 2025).

On September 2, 2025, a federal appeals court issued a final ruling that blocked the use of the AEA to deport Venezuelan migrants.  The court ruled that TdA members do not constitute an “invasion or predatory incursion” as required by the AEA (Zhuang & Balk, 2025).  While these recent court rulings have provided some relief for Venezuelan immigrants in the future, alleged TdA members were still deported under the AEA and experienced numerous human rights violations that have been largely ignored.  

Further Violations of Court Rulings

On April 7, the Supreme Court modified a previous order from Judge Boasberg, allowing deportations of Venezuelans to continue so long as the immigrants were given advance notice of their deportation.  This ruling was separate from the rulings surrounding the Alien Enemies Act and dealt with Venezuelan immigrants who were not accused of having TdA ties.  This advance notice required by the Supreme Court ruling would allow the immigrants to seek hearings or other judicial remedies to block unfair deportations (Zhuang & Balk, 2025).  In mid-April of 2025, Venezuelan immigrants in Texas were given only 24 hours notice of their deportation.  A stay was placed to delay their deportation, and the Supreme Court went on to rule that the government’s actions did not allow for sufficient due process (WMM v. Trump, 2025).  In another case, the immigrants were only given deportation notices in English, which was again ruled to violate due process requirements (Zhuang & Balk, 2025).  Despite court rulings that immigrants deserve the opportunity to exercise their habeas rights and appeal deportations, the US government has continuously worked to circumvent that ruling and provide as little advance warning as possible (Donald J. Trump, 2025).

Human Rights Violations

Non-refoulement

The 1984 Convention Against Torture (CAT) defines torture as physical or mental pain or suffering that is intentionally inflicted by a public official to coerce, punish, intimidate, or discriminate.  Article 3 of the Convention articulates the idea of non-refoulement: “no state shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” (1984).  The US ratified the Convention on April 18, 1988, meaning that the country is now obligated to abide by all provisions contained within the treaty (The Convention against Torture, 1988).  

The US has violated this treaty in multiple instances through their treatment of Venezuelan immigrants.  Firstly, Trump knowingly sent 238 men to CECOT despite its history of torture.  Based on the previous history of torture in the facility, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the behavior would be repeated against these men.  In fact, now that the men have been released from CECOT, they have spoken up about the abuse and terrible conditions they endured within the prison (Reichlin-Melnic, 2025).  Nongovernmental organizations and international organizations, including the UN, have raised concerns about the US’ behavior surrounding CECOT.  UN human rights experts worry that the principle of non-refoulement was violated due to the history of torture, death, violence, and overcrowding in El Salvador’s prisons (UN experts alarmed, 2025).  With a known history of torture in El Salvador and concerns raised by international organizations, the US was surely aware of the fact that it was violating international human rights law.  However, the fact that it continued with these actions anyway shows a lack of respect for their human rights obligations under CAT.

Another violation of the Convention Against Torture has not yet occurred but could theoretically arise if TPS is officially cancelled for Venezuelan immigrants.  Cases of torture and physical violence are well-documented in Venezuela, where there have been 1,652 cases of torture between 2013-2023.  In that same 10 year time frame, there were over 10,000 executions.  These violent incidents were primarily committed against political opponents or those who spoke out against the government (Venezuela: Country Profile, 2025).  With so many reported incidents of torture, many of the Venezuelan TPS holders, particularly those who have been outspoken against Maduro’s government, are at risk of being imprisoned or tortured upon return to Venezuela.  Based on the US’ obligations under the Convention Against Torture, they have a responsibility not to deport these people back to Venezuela, where they are at a high risk of experiencing state-sponsored torture.

Enforced disappearances

In the 1992 Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the UN General Assembly defines enforced disappearance as situations where “persons are arrested, detained, or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of government […] followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty”.  The deportation of Venezuelan men to CECOT shows characteristic signs of enforced disappearance.  Article 10 of the 1992 Declaration requires that any person who is arrested is held in “an officially recognized place of detention” and brought before a judge.  Furthermore, it stipulates that relevant family members must be informed of the incarceration (Declaration on Protection from Enforced Disappearance, 1992).  The men sent to El Salvador were not held in a recognized place of detention and, in fact, the US refused to even acknowledge that the men were in US custody.  Additionally, family members were not told about the whereabouts of their loved ones, as required by the declaration (Martinez-Beltran & Rueda, 2025).  All of these factors combine to suggest that the US was committing enforced disappearances when deporting these men to El Salvador.  

The US government may make the argument that the invocation of the Alien Enemies Act allowed them to violate existing due process and human rights laws.  However, Article 7 of the 1992 Declaration clearly states that a “threat of war, a state of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency” are not sufficient to justify enforced disappearances.  In other words, enforced disappearances are not permitted under any condition.  Furthermore, domestic court rulings, including those by Judge Boasberg, clearly stated that these Venezuelan immigrants were entitled to due process and a deportation hearing.  However, the Trump administration still continued to violate domestic court rulings and international human rights provisions that would have helped protect these Venezuelan men from the abuse and terror that they endured while held in CECOT.

When looking at the requirements laid out in the 1992 Declaration, it is important to note that the Declaration is not a legally binding treaty.  Rather, it is an aspirational document that sets goals and objectives that all states should try to abide by.  But, because it is non-binding, states can choose to not follow the treaty’s guidelines without punishment.  However, that does not mean that states should allow themselves to do so.  The international human rights system is reliant on trust and self-accountability on the part of states.  As one of the leading global powers, the US has an obligation to follow UN human rights treaties to the best of their ability.  Deporting men without due process and without protecting them from enforced disappearance is not an example of the US operating to the best of its ability.  The US must do better to protect the people within its jurisdiction and to set a strong example for other states to follow.

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

The Venezuelan men who were held in Guantanamo in February of 2025 reported treatment including beatings and excessive violence committed by guards in riot gear.  They also reported lack of access to showers, adequate bedding, and sufficient food and water.  Finally, some of the men reported being forced to strip down to only their underwear before sleeping (Kube & Ainsley, 2025).  The Venezuelan men were held in solitary confinement-style jail cells and were only allowed outside of their cells for one hour each day.  During that time, they were forbidden from communicating with one another.  These conditions were so extreme that some migrants attempted suicide (US: Migrants Face Abuse, 2025).  Although these treatments don’t necessarily rise to the level of torture as defined by the Convention Against Torture, this behavior is nonetheless not permitted under international law.

Article 16 of CAT mandates that all states must prevent “acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” that do not rise to the definition of torture but are harmful nonetheless (1984).  Inhuman and cruel treatment is viewed “as the infliction of severe and mental pain or suffering which goes beyond mere degradation or humiliation.  Outrages upon personal dignity are acts that humiliate, degrade or otherwise violate the dignity of the person to such a degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity” (Prohibition and punishment of torture, 2014).  The treatment that these men experienced most certainly violated their personal dignity as they were prevented access to basic sanitation and nutrition measures and forced to take off their clothing for prolonged periods of time.

It should come as no surprise that violations of human rights have continued at Guantanamo Bay given the questionable past of the incarceration institution.  When the prison was used solely to house Muslim prisoners, there were allegations of indefinite detention, torture, limited judicial protection, a lack of due process, and discrimination (Towards the Closure of Guantanamo, n.d.).  Numerous human rights institutions called out the US’ behavior at the facility, although change never really occurred (Guantanamo Bay: decades of injustice, 2025). Human rights institutions have continued to raise alarms about the conditions inside Guantanamo, with Human Rights Watch claiming that deportations to Guantanamo should stop immediately (US: Migrants Face Abuse, 2025).  This ongoing violation of human rights suggests a wider disregard for international human rights provisions by the Trump administration as they continue human rights-violating behavior that had been called out under multiple previous administrations.

Violations of Migration Law

International human rights law (IHRL), as outlined by the United Nations, “applies to all people at all times”.  Both a state’s citizens and any person under the state’s jurisdiction (both documented and undocumented immigrants) are protected by IHRL.  Within IHRL, the UN encourages finding alternatives to detention for migrants (International standards governing migration policy, n.d.).  However, that is not happening in the United States.  In addition to the use of CECOT and Guantanamo Bay as detention facilities for migrants, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement also operates countless migrant detention facilities domestically.  As of September 2025, nearly 60,000 migrants were detained in ICE facilities, a new high (Shapiro, 2025).  Although these facilities often hold people without criminal records, they operate like jails as migrants are shackled and held in cells.  The use of jail facilities to house migrants who have not committed any crimes does not abide by IHRL standards, and thus the practice must be reevaluated by the US government.

Another human rights document that outlines the treatment of migrants is the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.  While this document is non-binding, it was created in 2018 as an aspirational goal that outlines a transnational approach to immigration.  Article 13 of the document states that migration detention should be used “only as a measure of last resort”.  When it is used, detention must be non-arbitrary and be for as short a period as possible (Global Compact, 2018).  While it is difficult to define exactly what a short period means, the US is holding its migrants in detention for quite a while.  While some migrants are deported quickly from detention centers, others remain there for years.  Additionally, it is impossible for migrants to know how long they will be incarcerated for.  They are stuck in a period of limbo waiting for slow bureaucratic processes to determine their fate (Shapiro, 2025).

These migrants are being treated as criminals and incarcerated in detention facilities for prolonged periods of time, despite clear human rights provisions that discourage or even ban such behavior.  The US must work to decrease its migrant detention in accordance with human rights standards.

Ignoring Asylum Claims

Some of the men that were deported to El Salvador and CECOT were fleeing persecution that may have made them eligible for asylum (Trump’s Deportation Flights, n.d.).  The right of people to seek asylum is recognized in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Furthermore, the 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (1967). One of the men deported to CECOT, Andry Hernandez Romero, fled Venezuela to escape “political persecution and anti-LGBTQ violence” (Trump’s Deportation Flights, n.d.).  This likely would have made him eligible for refugee status due to persecution for both “membership of a particular social group” and “political opinion”.  Unfortunately, Romero was deported from the US before he had a chance to complete the asylum process.  

While receiving refugee status isn’t overly common for Venezuelan migrants, there are certainly some cases where it has been granted.  The UNHCR “does not consider most displaced Venezuelans to be refugees” (Brown et al., 2022).  That being said, in 2024, the US granted refugee status to 12,890 Venezuelans (Yap, 2025).  This represented a jump from 160 Venezuelan refugees in 2022 and 1,370 in 2023 (Schofield & Yap, 2024).  So, TPS is the much more common immigration designation for Venezuelan migrants; however, certain cases (such as Hernandez Romero’s) make a viable case for refugee status.

Article 32 of the 1951 Refugee Convention states that refugees can only be removed from a country “in accordance with due process of law”.  In general, states should only deport refugees “on grounds of national security or public order” (The 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967).  The Trump administration would argue that these deportations of alleged TdA members were committed on the basis of national security and public order; however, previous court cases surrounding the Alien Enemies Act and due process deportees seem to suggest that they were not.  Because alleged TdA members were deported on faulty evidence such as tattoos, the US government cannot make the case that these men were posing a verified threat to national security.  As a result, the government did not have a valid basis on which to deport these men as required by the Refugee Convention.

The principle of non-refoulement is also found in the Convention, with Article 33 banning a country from returning a refugee to a country where “his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group of political opinion” (The 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967).  The only exception to this would be if the refugee poses a public danger in the country where he has immigrated (The 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967).  Violations of these provisions have occurred by deporting alleged TdA members back to Venezuela, where they could face discrimination, torture, imprisonment, or even death for their sexual orientation or political views.  Many of these TdA members are being deported despite little to no evidence that they pose a public danger.  All in all, the requirements for deportation of a refugee are not being met and yet the asylum seekers are being deported anyway.  These actions represent yet another clear and deliberate violation of human rights standards by the Trump administration.

It is important to note that the US has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention; however, they have ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (States parties, 1951).  These two treaties are essentially identical, with the 1967 Protocol simply expanding the scope of the 1951 Convention across all times and places.  In other words, by ratifying the 1967 Protocol, the United States has also bound itself to the requirements found in the 1951 Convention (The 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967).

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which is the regional human rights system for North and South America, has recently expressed concern about changes in US refugee policy.  They fear a trend where the US will only accept refugees “who can fully and appropriately assimilate into the United States” (IACHR expresses concern, 2025).  This suggests possible discrimination over who is granted refugee status, which is not permitted under international refugee law.  Article 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention states that the Convention’s provisions must be applied “without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin”.  

These concerns from the Inter-American Commission are supported by reports that Trump has considered overhauling the refugee system to prioritize “English speakers, white South Africans and Europeans who oppose migration” (Kanno-Youngs & Aleaziz, 2025). These plans come after Trump requested the State and Homeland Security Departments to research whether refugee programs were contrary to the US’ national interest.  While these programs have not yet been officially implemented, they have not been rejected either.  These plans come as part of a rising fear by the US government that “the sharp increase in diversity [in the US] has reduced the level of social trust essential for the functioning of a democratic polity” (Kanno-Youngs & Aleaziz, 2025).  While none of these policies have been implemented as of October 2025, this still represents a highly frightening willingness of the current US government to blatantly ignore human rights provisions.  These changes to the refugee system would demonstrate clear discrimination based on race and country of origin.  Additionally, it would exclude or disadvantage refugees of the greatest need, including those from Venezuela.  The refugee system was not intended to maintain a uniform, homogenous country but rather to aid those in dire need around the world.  The US must treat all refugees equally and prioritize the humanitarian situation of their country of origin rather than their racial and linguistic assimilation abilities.  International refugee law requires such behavior, and the US has ratified treaties binding them to conform with refugee law.  Any action that bases refugee status on race or national origin is a blatant violation of the US’ human rights obligation.

General Disregard for Human Rights Requirements

The specific violations that are outlined above are part of a wider trend of human rights disobedience that is currently happening in the US.  In 2025, the United States refused to attend its scheduled Universal Periodic Review (UPR), hosted by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).  The UPR process, which began in 2008, is a peer review process, whereby states submit self-reports about their human rights behavior, which are then critiqued and analyzed by other states.  Per the process, each state undergoes review every 4 to 5 years, and each review generates actionable areas of improvement in the realm of human rights.

However, the US’ recent refusal to participate jeopardizes this entire system.  This decision marks only the second time in the UPR’s history that a state has refused to undergo review.  This choice also represents a marked shift in the US’ approach to human rights.  Withdrawing from the UPR “represents not merely procedural noncompliance, but a deliberate recalibration of US foreign policy that positions human rights norms as dispensable instruments of diplomacy rather than binding obligations of governance” (HUQUQ Research Team, n.d.).  

Furthermore, other governments will almost certainly use this refusal as justification for their own withdrawals from the UPR.  Autocratic governments will argue that if the US is not undergoing the review process, they should not either.  This move represents a frightening shift in US and global human rights abidance.  While Trump has already shown a certain disrespect towards human rights norms, this move is at another level.  It raises concerns that Trump does not consider himself bound by human rights obligations and will thus continue to violate them for the rest of his time in office (HUQUQ Research Team, n.d.).

Implications/Conclusions

Possible Motivations

While it is impossible to know what exactly has motivated the recent treatment of Venezuelan immigrants, it seems certain that the justifications that Noem has given are not the true reason.  Her claims that TPS is no longer necessary for Venezuelans due to gang threats and improved conditions in Venezuela are not supported by evidence presented in this paper.  So, there must be another reason motivating the decision.  Recent reports that the Trump administration wants to prioritize white, English-speaking refugees provide a possible motivation.  This decision represents a desire for the Trump administration to achieve a more homogenous white population that is easily able to conform to the “American” culture.  As a result, the decision to terminate TPS could be viewed as part of a wider agenda to decrease the number of immigrants and minorities living in the US.  By terminating TPS for Venezuelans, the administration has been able to decrease deportation protections for the Hispanic Venezuelan population and thus decrease the number of those people living in the US.  As a result, they are achieving a more homogenous non-Hispanic population.  While it is nearly impossible to prove that this is the true motivation, the refugee decision and recent xenophobic statements against Hispanic immigrants suggest it may be the case.  If this is truly the reason behind the termination of TPS, it is a grievous violation of human rights standards and domestic law.  There is no provision that permits discrimination based on race or ethnic origin, and permitting such behavior would set a highly dangerous precedent for the future.  Consequently, it would be an extreme violation of domestic and international human rights law that would need to be appropriately addressed and punished immediately.

Standards of Other Countries

The US is by no means the only country accepting Venezuelan immigrants.  Since 2015, 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled the country, and 6.5 million of those currently live in Latin America or the Carribbean.  Some of the main receiving countries besides the United States are Colombia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina (Venezuelans Access Regularization Pathways, n.d.).  Colombia, a neighboring country of Venezuela, has been particularly inundated with an influx of Venezuelan immigrants.  Beginning in 2021, they adopted their own Temporary Protective Statute (ETPV, for its abbreviation in Spanish).  The program is estimated to help 1.8 million Venezuelans living in Colombia and provides these immigrants access to national health services and work opportunities (Implementation and socialization of the ETPV, 2023).  In 2023, Colombia’s ETPV program was expanded to provide 10 year residential status to Venezuelans (Banulescu-Bogdan et al., 2025).  Other Latin American countries that are receiving Venezuelan immigrants are taking similar steps to expand their programs and ensure that Venezuelans are able to live safely in their countries (Venezuelans Access Regularization Pathways, n.d.).

Suggestions for US Improvement

Whatever the reason behind the recent treatment of Venezuelan immigrants, there are numerous violations that have occurred that need to be addressed and prevented from happening again.  The current treatment that the US government is providing to Venezuelan immigrants does not meet international human rights standards or align with domestic precedents.  The saga began with Secretary of DHS Noem’s attempt to cancel TPS for Venezuela despite an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country.  Previous precedent surrounding TPS suggests that a country’s TPS status should be continued for as long as conditions in the country remain unsafe.  Venezuela’s GDP, crime rates, political oppression, and censorship suggest that conditions have not improved enough to merit TPS cancellation.  Beyond that, President Trump invoked the 1798 Alien Enemies Act to deport 238 alleged gang members to a dangerous El Salvadoran prison.  These actions violated international human rights provisions surrounding enforced disappearances and non-refoulement.

The US government has cited the Venezuelan TPS program as being contrary to the national interest, particularly in regards to the Tren de Aragua gang members that are allegedly living in the country.  In reality, there are likely very few Tren de Aragua members on TPS.  The threat posed by Tren de Aragua does not outweigh the interests of protecting the hundreds of thousands of other TPS recipients who are here to improve living conditions for themselves and their families.  Other Latin American countries have expanded their Venezuelan immigrant protection programs, while the US has cut theirs back.

The US should follow the actions taken by Latin American governments and, most importantly, immediately modify its behavior to align with international human rights norms and requirements. 

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